University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 26
Number 1 Summer/Fall 1995

Article 2

1995

Child Custody and Visitation in Maryland: In the
Best Interests of the Child
Kim H. McGavin

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
McGavin, Kim H. (1995) "Child Custody and Visitation in Maryland: In the Best Interests of the Child," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 26 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol26/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION IN MARYLAND:
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Kim H. McGavin
control of their minor children,4 though gradually over
the nineteenth century many states either adopted the
doctrine of "tender years," awarding custody of children under seven years of age to mothers, or enacted
laws granting equal rights in custody to both parents. 5
By the 1920's, various historical trends converged to
further diminish the paternal preference. 6 Society
became increasingly concerned with the welfare of
children during the industrial revolution, and family
responsibilities became divided between "wage
earner" and "child nurturer" as fathers sought work
in cities away from the farm or village. 7 Moreover,
elevation of women's legal status during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also contributed to the
movement from "paternal" to "maternal" preference. 8
Maryland adopted the maternal preference presumption, considering mothers to be the natural custodians of young children, 9 and courts generally granted
custody to mothers unless they were found to be unfit. 10
Since 1974, however, the maternal preference doctrine
has been abolished in Maryland II because it permitted
the award ofcustody to the mother solely upon the basis
of her sex. 12 Today, when determining custody between biological parents, each stands, at least initially,
on equal footing before the court.
Parents may, of course, reach custody and visitation agreements outside of court. These private
agreements may be advantageous because they
allow parents to determine which arrangements will
best serve the
needs of the child, satisfy
parental desires, and maintain family values while
preserving the family's economic resources. 13 Unfortunately, oftentimes parents create these agreements
Biological Parent Versus Biological Parent
without knowledge of options available to them.
In Maryland, as between biological parents, there is Moreover, parents do not demonstrate much foresight
no presumption that either parent has a superior right in planning for long-term eventualities. 14 In addition,
over the other for the custody oftheir children. 3 At early such agreements are subject to modification by the
common law, fathers were entitled to the custody and court which will decide whether the provisions con-

Considerable discussion has taken place recently
over what is the real meaning of "in the best interests of
the child" and whether this is an appropriate standard
for making custody and visitation decisions. Much of
this debate has focused on the highly divided interests
ofbiological parents and those ofthird parties, adoptive
parents, and biological grandparents. Fortunately, in
Maryland there is some guidance for establishing priorities.
Maryland courts apply the "best interests" standard to custody and visitation determinations. I While
various presumptions grant certain parties favored status in determining custody and visitation rights, the
overriding mandate under the "best interests" standard
is for courts to create a custody/visitation arrangement
which will promote the welfare of the child. The most
desirable aspect of the "best interests" standard is that
it focuses the decision-making process on the child's
psychological and developmental needs, "rather than
on parental demands, societal stereotypes, or legal
tradition."2 The flexibility implicit in the standard
enables courts to be more responsive to the particular
needs of each case by permitting examination on an
individual basis.
There is, however, a lack of uniformity in the
application of the "best interests" standard. While,
ideally, the child's developmental and psychological
needs should be given paramount consideration under
this standard, in reality those needs are frequently
subordinated to parental rights as courts struggle both
to honor legal traditions and respond to changing social
norms.
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tained therein truly are in the best interests ofthe child. 15
Maryland courts consider a multitude of factors
when determining whether any given custody/visitation
arrangement will serve the child's best interest. Included among these factors are: abuse or neglect of the
child,16 adultery, 17 cohabitation,18 desires of the child, 19
fitness of the parents,20 character and conduct of the
parties,21 age, health, and sex of the child,22 the desires
of the natural parents and any agreements between
them,23 the potential for maintaining natural family
relations,24 material opportunities affecting the child's
future,25 and prior voluntary abandonment or surrender.26 The court's most difficult task lies in ascertaining
and weighing all of the pertinent factors. Maryland
courts have wide discretion in determining, on a case by
case basis, which factors will be considered and how
much weight will be given anyone of them. Although
it appears from case law that no one factor, by itself,
would be adequate for a denial of custody or visitation,
it is difficult to know precisely what combination of
factors the court would find sufficient.
Regardless of which parent is awarded custody, the
noncustodial parent is usually permitted visitation privileges. The term "child visitation right" is used to
denote a noncustodial, biological parent's natural and
legal right to see his or her child. 27 This right, however,
is not an absolute right in that (1) courts may refuse to
uphold it when its exercise would be detrimental to the
child,28 and (2) it may be terminated pursuant to a
confidential adoption. 29 Generally, a noncustodial parent's visitation right may not be terminated absent
compliance with statutory procedures and a formal
court decree,30 nor may he or she be non-judicially
deprived of it, by the custodial parent, for failure to pay
child support or alimony.31
Private agreements forfeiting visitation rights may
not be upheld if, in the court's determination, a resumption ofthe parent-child relationship is in the best interest
of the child. Such agreements may even be held void as
against Maryland's public policy that continuance ofthe
parent-child relationship, absent extraordinary circumstances, is in the child's best interest.
Under Maryland law, a presumption exists that a
child will benefit most by continued association with the
noncustodial, biological parent. So strong is this presumption that, alone, none of the following conditions
have been found to be so detrimental to the child as to
preclude a parent from exercising his or her visitation
4 - U. BaIt. L.F. / 26.1

rights: sexual or other immoral conduct,32 failure to
attend visitation sessions,33 threats or acts of physical or
sexual abuse,34 alcoholism,35 conviction of a serious
criminal offense,36 failure to pay child support and
alimony,37 abandonment or lapse of time between visits,38 derogatory remarks made by one parent about the
other parent,39 removal of the child from the jurisdiction,40 and differing religious views. 41
Maryland courts have not, to date, completely
denied visitation rights to a noncustodial parent. In the
case of physical or sexual abuse, it seems paradoxical
for a court to determine that a child is best served by
continued association with his or her abuser, especially
since courts claim to give paramount consideration to
the welfare of the child when weighing the interests of
each. Court decisions granting visitation to abusive,
noncustodial parents are also troubling in light of the
modest deference given to the desires of the child. 42
While the principal reason for granting visitation is the
perceived benefit to the child, forcing a reluctant child
to visit an abusive parent may be detrimental to the
child's emotional and psychological well-being. 43
At once, Maryland courts claim that (1) the child's
best interest is of paramount consideration,44 (2) parental rights "sink into insignificance" in relation to the
child's best interests,45 and (3) that a parent's right to
visitation will be denied only under extraordinary circumstances. 46 Under this framework, courts contend
that the interests ofthe parents are subordinate to those
of the child, yet the child's interests actually become
subservient to t~e parent's right to a continuing relationship. Often what is in the best interest of the child
is severance of the parent-child relationship, but courts
are so reluctant to terminate parental rights that they
are, in fact, merely searching for the least detrimental
alternative.
Courts in Maryland recognize that, generally, a
child's best interest is served by continued association
with his or her natural parent. Research has demonstrated "a positive relationship between a child's selfesteem and continued contact with the noncustodial
parent; the greater the contact, the higher the sense of
self-esteem. "47 The benefits derived from encouraging
parent-child visitation go beyond the possibility of
promoting a child's self-esteem or providing parental
love and companionship. Rather, even in cases where
the noncustodial parent is not a "good" parent, parentchild visitation should still be pursued inasmuch as

"sooner or later [the child] must see [the parent] in
accurate perspective and eliminate whatever fantasies
he may have had. "48
To do justice under the "best interests" standard,
courts must endeavor to learn what the actual interests
ofthe child are rather than rely on various presumptions
regarding those interests. 49 In balancing parental rights
against the child's actual interests, courts need to be
more concerned with assessing the practical impact of
visitation, placing greater weight on the desires of an
abused child in particular, and less concerned with
upholding parental rights.

custody of the natural parent, and the nature and
strength ofties between the child and the third person. 58
In making custody decisions between biological
parents and third persons, courts are frequently confronted with the concept of "psychological parent."
The "psychological parent" theory, advocated by
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit in
their 1973 book, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child,
suggests that once a child has been separated from his
or her natural parents for a sufficient length oftime, any
bonds oflove or affection between the child and his or
her natural parents will weaken. 59 Simultaneously, a
strong psychological tie will develop between the child
and the third person. 60 The third person becomes the
Biological Parents Versus Third Persons
child's "psychological parent," the person to whom the
Though in Maryland the custody claim ofone parent child looks for security, love, physical care, nourishis not given preference to that of the other, biological ment, and a sense of emotional well-being. 61 Once this
parents still enjoy superiority over claims made by third bond is formed, removal ofthe child from the "psychopersons. A presumption exists that the child is best logical parent" is thought to cause the child severe
served by reposing custody in the natural parents. 50 emotional trauma. 62 Theoretically, a child under five
Custody may, however, be granted to remote members years of age, separated from his biological parent for
of the family or to non-biological third persons when two months, will sever his emotional ties to his biologthe court has found the natural parents to be unfit or if ical parent and forge an allegiance to his "psychological
exceptional circumstances exist which would make parent." Separation from the "psychological parent"
placement with the natural parents detrimental to the and return to the biological parent after this two month
child's welfare. 51
period, presumably, will be detrimental to the child's
Questions of parental fitness generally fall within best interests. 63 Similar correlations factoring the age of
the following categories: moral fitness;52 psychological the child, time apart from the natural parent, and
or emotional fitness;53 prior conduct affecting the child's formation of the "psychological parent" bond can be
physical, psychological, and financial needs;54 and love used as a basis for determining whether a return of the
and affection for the child including willingness and child to the natural parent's custody will serve the
ability to care for the child. 55 Although historically child's best interests.
Maryland courts have been reluctant to embrace the
courts took a moralistic view in examining parental
conduct, 56 today such conduct seems to be considered "psychological parent" argument in child custody casonly in light of its effect on the child. If a parent's es. In Montgomery County Dep 't of Social Servs. v.
conduct is not found to adversely affect the child or Sanders,64 the court rejected the notion that its custody
diminish the quality of care a child receives, then a decision should be made on the basis ofthe "psychological parent" concept. 65 The court believed that accepparent will, most likely, not be deemed unfit. 57
Factors which may be of probative value in deter- tance ofthe "psychological parent" principle would be
mining whether "exceptional circumstances" exist in- tantamount to adopting a mathematical process by
clude: the length of time the child has been away from which custody could be determined by measuring the
the natural parent, the age of the child when care was child's age and time apart from his biological parents. 66
assumed by the third person, the period of time which To do so would place the court in the position of
elapsed before the natural parent sought to reclaim the "rubber stamping" determinations made by psycholochild, the emotional impact on the child created by a gists and psychiatrists utilizing this formula. "Custody
change in custody, the sincerity and intensity of the cases involve too many people, conditions, and human
natural parent's desire to have the child, the stability and emotions to be reduced summarily to a mere mathematcertainty regarding the child's future if placed in the ical process. "67
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Consistent with the Sanders decision, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, in Lipiano v. Lipiano,68
refused to distinguish between various degrees of third
persons such as "natural" parents and "equitable"
parents. 69 While rejecting these distinctions, the court,
however, acknowledged that the closeness of the relationship between a child and a third person would be a
factor to be considered in determining whether "exceptional circumstances" existed, thus warranting placement of the child in the custody of the third person. 70
In summary, as between biological parents and third
persons, custody with the biological parents is presumed to be in the best interest of the child. It is a
rebuttable presumption which places the burden on the
third person to show that either the parent is unfit or that
exceptional circumstances exist which make placement
with the third person preferable. 71
Should a child be returned to his or her biological
parent, a third person may have difficulty in securing
visitation privileges inasmuch as (1) there is no presumption, as with natural parents, that continuation of
the relationship is in the child's best interest, and (2)
there is no statute granting visitation rights as is available for the child's grandparents. However, since a
court has the power to place custody with a third person
when it deems it to be in the child's best interest, that
power may well permit a court to grant visitation to
third persons under appropriate circumstances. On the
other hand, when a child is taken from his natural
parents and placed in the custody of third persons,
visitation by natural parents may be granted by the court
if it is deemed to be in the best interest of the child. 72
Grandparental Custody and Visitation Rights
As between biological parents and biological grandparents, Maryland courts prefer placing custody of
children with their biological parents. 73 Maryland courts
will only grant custody to a grandparent, over the
desires of the natural parents, in exceptional circumstances. 74 An equity court in Maryland may, however,
grant a petition permitting grandparents to visit their
grandchildren if it is deemed to be in the best interests
of the child. 75
Interestingly, effective October 1, 1993, an Amendment to section 9-102 of the Family Law Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code deleted from the former
statute the introductory phrase, "[a]t any time after the
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termination of a marriage by divorce, annulment or
death" and also deleted from subsection (1) the phrase
"of a natural or adopted child of the parties whose
marriage has been terminated" and inserted "of a
grandchild" following "grandparent." The revised
statute states that "[ a]n equity court may: (1) consider
a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a
grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be in the best
interests of the child, grant visitation rights to the
grandparent." These changes seem to effect the result
that grandparents now enjoy a separate right of visitation, for adopted or natural grandchildren, independent
of the disposition of the marital union. 76
Prior to the change, significant ambiguity existed as
to whether a grandparent only had standing to petition
for visitation ifit were in connection with the termination of a marriage by divorce, annulment or death.
Maryland courts, however, refused to give such a
narrow reading to the former statute and instead, in
1984, indicated that visitation could be permitted under
these circumstances (termination of marriage by divorce, annulment or death), but that the statute "does
not limit the power of a court as to custody and
visitation by grandparents under other circumstances"
(emphasis added). n This interpretation permitted courts
to grant petitions to grandparents to visit their grandchildren whether or not the marital union terminated.
Ostensibly, it also made possible the grant of petitions
to grandparents for visitation with natural grandchildren who become adopted by third persons.
Such broad discretion was reigned in, however,
when the Court of Special Appeals ofMaryland ruled in
L.F.M v. Department ofSocial Servs., 78 that when "the
rights of the natural parents have been terminated and
a child has been placed for confidential adoption, the
courts of this state are not empowered to award visitation to the child's natural family over the objection ofthe
guardian with the right to consent to adoption and the
prospective adoptive parents.'79 Under this ruling,
grandparents, who acquire their visitation rights through
the child's natural parents, are included in the court's
use of the phrase "child's natural family." Maryland
courts then had no power, despite the statute, to grant
grandparents visitation rights should their grandchildren subsequently become adopted.
On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland remedied this dilemma by its ruling in In re
Adoption No. 92A 4]80 that "adoption does not auto-

matically vitiate the grandparental visitation rights,"
and holding that section 5-308 of the Family Law
Article ofthe Maryland Annotated Code only severs the
rights of a living natural parent and does not affect the
rights of the parent's mother or father. 81
The broadness of the language in the revised statute
taken together with the ruling of In re Adoption No.
92A41, makes possible further challenges between the
rights ofadoptive parents and the visitation privileges of
grandparents. Under present statutory and case law, it
appears that if visitation by the grandparents would be
in the best interests of the child, Maryland courts may
be empowered to grant it even over the objection ofthe
adoptive parents. 82
Biological Parents Versus Adoptive Parents
From a sociological viewpoint, adoptions are desirable mechanisms for providing children with opportunities to be raised in families capable of providing them
with the love, care, support, and nurturing they need.
Adoptions also provide biological parents with a means
by which they may secure the care oftheir children when
they themselves are either incapable, unfit, or unwilling
to do SO.83 Moreover, adults who are otherwise unable
to have children are permitted an opportunity to enter
parenthood, gaining both the rights and responsibilities
of natural parents.
To facilitate the achievement ofthese societal goals,
state legislatures have enacted various laws governing
adoptions. In Maryland, adoption does not exist at
common law. 84 Instead, adoption is governed by section 5, subtitle 3 of the Family Law Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code which seeks to protect the
interests of the child, natural parents, and adoptive
parents. Maryland statutes endeavor to (1) protect
children from "unnecessary separation from their natural parents ... and ... [from] adoption by individuals who
are unfit for the responsibility,"85 (2) protect "natural
parents from a hurried or ill-considered decision to give
up a child,"86 and (3) protect adoptive parents "by
providing them information about the child and the
child's background ... and ... from a future disturbance
oftheir relationship with the child by a natural parent."81
Under Maryland law, "[a]ny adult may petition a
court to decree an adoption,"88 and "[a]ny individual,
whether a minor or an adult, may be adopted."89
Maryland courts have even permitted the adoption of a

child by one natural parent without the consent of the
other. 90 Adoptions, however, may not be accomplished
in Maryland absent compliance with statutory procedures and a formal judicial decree. 91
Adoption Procedures
In order to grant an adoption, a Maryland court
must generally have the consent of both natural parents
as well as the consent of the individual to be adopted, if
that individual is at least ten years of age.92 Natural
parents and judicially appointed guardians may revoke
their consent either within thirty calendar days after the
filing of the consent or prior to the entry of a final
adoption decree, whichever occurs first. 93 The individual to be adopted may withdraw his or her consent at any
time before either an interlocutory or final adoption
decree is entered. 94 Under certain circumstances, a
court may order an adoption without the consent ofthe
natural parents,95 but because the consequences of
adoption are so severe for natural parents, it will not do
so unless clearly determined to be in the best interests
of the child. 96
Once the formal court decree is issued, "each living
natural parent ofthe individual adopted" is relieved of
"all parental duties and obligations" and is also divested of "all parental rights. "91 The adopted child becomes, for all intents and purposes, the child of the
adoptive parents, and "is entitled to all the rights and
privileges ofand is subj ect to all the obligations ofa child
born to the [adoptive parents] in wedlock. "98 A legal
relationship is established between the adoptive parents
and the child which serves as a complete substitute for
the relationship the child had with his or her biological
parents. 99 Accordingly, all rights and duties of the
natural parents, including the rights of custody and
visitation, become the rights and duties of the adoptive
parents. 100 The rights ofadoptive parents, however, like
those ofnatural parents, are not absolute but must yield
to the best interests of the child. 101
Under Maryland Rule 625(a), courts have the power to revise or modify an adoption decree for thirty days
after the entry of the final order. While interlocutory
and final decrees or orders are appealable under section
5-330 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland
Annotated Code, jurisdictional and procedural challenges to the validity of a final adoption decree must be
filed within one year. 102 After these periods have
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elapsed, final adoption decrees may only be invalidated
in Maryland on the bases of fraud, mistake, or irregularity in obtainment; otherwise, the decree is deemed final
and binding. 103 The court record is then sealed and may
only be opened by order of the court. I04
Privacy of Adoption Records
Foreclosing access to adoption records advances
the goals of protecting natural parents from disclosure
of the circumstances surrounding the child's birth,
shelters most adoptees from the stigma of illegitimacy,
enhances the opportunity for adoptive parents to raise
the child unhindered by the natural parents,105 assists
with emotional and psychological closure for mothers
who have experienced an unwanted pregnancy, and
permits the natural parents to go on with their lives
secure in the beliefthat the child will not return to invade
their privacy. 106 Such a guarantee of confidentiality and
anonymity, arguably, enhances and strengthens the
adoption system,107 and is consistent with the idea that
the adoptive relationship is a complete substitute for the
biological relationship. However, the concept of complete substitution is only a legal fiction as these relationships are only identical in the legal sense. Adopted
children have shown a strong psychological need to
learn about their biological origins. 108 Such children
often experience greater difficulty in establishing a
sense of identity. 109 Courts must begin to recognize the
inherent needs of adopted children, respecting a child's
right to know and preserve his or her true, biological
identity.
Yet, courts have never recognized childrens' rights
as being coextensive to those of adults. Children are
especially vulnerable to exploitation and mistreatment,
and children are unable to make certain decisions in a
rational and mature manner. I 10 Denying access to
information concerning the identity of the adopted
child's natural parents may be justified while the child is
a minor, but when an adopted child becomes an adult,
he or she is no longer in need of the court's special
protection. III
Granting a child an opportunity to discover the
identity of his or her natural parents is not necessarily
detrimental to either the child or the adoption system.
In cases other than adoption, when custody is reposed
in persons other than the natural parent, the parent-child
relationship is deemed to be so beneficial to the child
8 - U. Bait. L.F. / 26.1

that visitation rights are not denied to even the most
errant parent. Denial of access to the identity of natural
parents after an adoption, therefore, seems incongruent
and appears to place the interests of the natural parents, 112 adoptive parents, 113 and the State l14 above those
of the child. These competing interests may, nevertheless, be protected, though subordinated to those of the
child, by creating a system which would permit access
to the adoption records by a third party intermediary
once the child has reached the age ofmajority or, ifwhile
a minor, with the adoptive parents' consent. A determination may be made as to the actual desires of the
biological parents, rather than assuming they want
secrecy.1I5 Birth mothers often never come to terms
with the emotional consequences of their decision to
give up a child, and many natural parents are not adverse
to a reunion with their children. 116
F ears of adoptive parents may be allayed inasmuch
as natural parents, by virtue of the adoption decree,
have been divested of their rights to make decisions
regarding the child. Furthermore, adoptive parents,
exercising custodial rights, may chaperone as well as
limit the number and duration of visits with the natural
parents. Moreover, once adopted childrenreach majority' adoptive parents have realized their desire to raise
their "child" without interference from the natural
parents.
The State's interest in promoting and protecting the
adoption system, by guaranteeing confidentiality to
natural parents, is protected by giving natural parents an
opportunity to maintain their privacy by refusing to
consent to the opening of the sealed records. In such
cases, disclosure ofthe natural parents' identity may be
denied upon a balancing of the interests by the court.
In Maryland, absent a private agreement between
the natural and adoptive parents, 117 visitation between
the adopted child and his or her natural parents ceases
upon entry of the final adoption decree. Such private
agreements will be upheld provided they are in the best
interests of the child and are not violative of public
policy.1I8 While Maryland courts will enforce these
private agreements, they may not be able to order
visitation because to do so may prove contrary to
statutes severing parental rights l19 as well as those
protecting adoptive parents from interference by natural parents. 120
Recently, battles waged by biological parents seeking to reclaim custody of their adopted children have

surged to the forefront offamily law. At issue in these
cases is whether the child's interests will be best served
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